The Right to Remedial Secession and the Puzzle of Peace

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ABSTRACT

Many studies on public international law and peace have focused on the role self-determination played in bringing about independence and liberty in third-world countries. Besides self-determination, this article seeks to investigate the dilemma surrounding the right to remedial secession and its inability to lead to peace in Africa. Political leadership in Africa is encountering numerous human rights violations, discrimination and marginalisation, which has led to civil conflicts. In the search for peace and security, many people have been clamouring for the right to secession but unfortunately, peace has remained a tragedy on the continent. By analysing whether the right to remedial secession entails automatic peace, this article reveals that most rights to secession granted to many communities in Africa do not lead to peace. It is argued that granting the right to secession in a community where there is lack of political will and patriotism, in a community divided along tribal lines, and a community marred by deep-rooted corruption and nepotism; will not bring about peace and security. Thus, there is need for Africans to have strong political will and be more patriotic, and overcome corruption, ethnicity and nepotism for the remedial right to lead to peace. To arrive at these assertions, the article adopted a qualitative research analysis with an exploratory approach.

INTRODUCTION

From South Sudan and Sudan in the northern part of Africa all the way to Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Central Africa, from Kenya to Somaliland and Somalia, and to Ethiopia in the east and Horn of Africa; the right to secession

as an option to end ethnic violence and civil war transfuses every day's news. The right to secession as a concept in international law literature is believed to be a remedy for people suffering from violent conflict that was fuelled by marginalisation and discrimination. It is conceived as an alternative to conflict and thus helps achieve peace and security. Scholars have argued that many of the ethnic violence and civil wars revolve around the issues of a lack of inclusiveness and discrimination of political leaders.

Brilmayer says that although some ethnic struggles concern issues of domestic political fairness, many involve secessionist claims (Brilmayer 1991:177). He further argues that secessionists' demands, unlike claims about domestic political fairness, cannot be satisfied through domestic political reforms; instead, they aim to redraw the political boundaries (Brilmayer 1991:177). It is vital to note that while discrimination, and marginalisation that fuelled violence and civil wars; might be used as a driving force towards claiming secession, cases drawn from Africa have shown that secessionists are actually driven by hidden agendas; not necessarily the search for peace. Today in the media all over Africa and beyond, the cries and tears for the South Cameroon people claiming secession from Cameroon is overwhelming. South Cameroon accuses Paul Bia's government of marginalisation and discrimination; therefore, it wants its own autonomy and independence from his political leadership.

Similarly, the same secession sentiments are currently echoed by the followers of the former Prime Minister, Raila Odinga. Members of his coalition political party named National Super Alliance (NASA), together with his community; unsatisfied with the outcome of the 2017 general elections, and their perception that their presidential candidate Raila Odinga would not make it to the presidency; echoed on media claiming secession statements. This means that anybody who seems to have failed to reach his own personal political interest reverts to secession as a last resort. If secession would lead to peace why has South Sudan never experienced a moment of peace and yet secession that separated them from Sudan took place?

The perception exists that the right to secession enshrined in the literature on public international law, helps countries undergoing civil and ethnic wars to achieve peace; remains a mystery in Africa. The central question the article seeks to answer is: does the right to secession as applied to civil wars and ethnic conflicts in Africa under the parameters of the international law entail an automatic peace? Hence, the aim of this article is to explore the dilemma surrounding the right of secession and its inability to lead to peace in Africa. This will be substantiated by the many examples and lessons drawn from Africa to confirm and affirm that the right to secession does not necessarily lead to conflict resolution or peace in Africa.

This article starts by discussing the conceptual and theoretical details surrounding the concept of secession. This is done by exploring the notion or the right to self-determination as it leads to the right of secession. This is because one cannot talk of secession without mentioning the notion of self-determination. Hereafter, it is stipulated that due to the lack of patriotism and political will on the side of Africans and their leaders the right of secession has difficulty in leading to peace and security on the continent. The second part of the article explores factors that cause the right to secession accorded to secessionists not leading to peace and security, rather intensifying conflicts on the continent. The third part of the article explores selected examples of current African states that were granted the right of secession to secede from their mother countries in the search for peace and yet have not experienced a moment of peace. The article concludes by asserting unless the mindsets of Africans and their leaders are changed and transformed, the right to secession does not necessarily guarantee peace and security in Africa.

Why and what is so unique about some minority groups and many other people when unhappy with any political leadership talk about marginalisation and discrimination to justify their quest for the right to secede? Is secession a guarantee to peace, and when exactly and under what circumstances does the right to secession lead automatically to peace? These are important and complex questions.

THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The right to self-determination is a concept that has a strong appeal. It is an essential norm of international law which is reflected both in treaty law and customary international law (Vezbergaite 2011:2). It gives people a free choice which allows them to determine and conduct their own destiny (Franck, *et al.* 1992:248). Cop and Eymirlioglu mentioned in their work that the right to self-determination was "the touchstone for peacemakers at Versailles" (Cop and Eymirlioglu 2003:116). Later on, it was explicitly embraced by the United States' President Woodrow Wilson, by Lenin and others, and became the guiding principles of the reconstruction of Europe following World War I (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:9).

It is also argued by Malcolm (2003) that the primary appearance of the principle of self-determination materialised after the First World War (Malcolm 2003:225). It is further argued that the right to self-determination was incorporated into the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which later evolved into the United Nations (UN) Charter (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:9). Its inclusion in the UN Charter marked the universal recognition of the principle as fundamental to the maintenance

of friendly relations and peace among states (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:9). Self-determination is recognised as a right of all peoples in the first article common to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which both came into force in 1976 (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:9–11). For a better understanding, Michael and Onno quote paragraph 1 of the above-mentioned article which provides: "all peoples have the right to self-determination and by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:9–11). This means that self-determination is a right which all people regardless their ethnic, religious, cultural backgrounds are entitled to.

Van Walt and Onno continue that the right to self-determination of people has been recognised in many other international and regional instruments, including the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, the Helsinki Final Act adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981, the CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe adopted in 1990, and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:10). Furthermore, it has been affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Namibia case, the Western Sahara case and the East Timor case, in which its egregious character was confirmed (Van Walt and Seroo 1998:10). Moreover, the scope and content of the right to self-determination has been elaborated upon by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and numerous leading international jurists (Van Walt and Seroo 1998: 9). Based on the above, it means that the right to self-determination is well established and recognised by all as a right to all people. This leads us to the next point of tracing the historical background of the right to self-determination.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The origin of the principle of self-determination can be traced back to the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789, which marked the demise of the notion that individuals and peoples, as subjects of the kings, were objects to be transferred, alienated, ceded, or protected in accordance with the interests of the monarch (Cassese 1995:11). The raison d'être of the self-determination principle, as explained; lies in the American and French insistence that the government be responsible to the people. And as a concept, self-determination was born and destined to play a major role in the development of the international community (Cassese 1995:13).

A number of important studies on self-determination have been conducted and summarised into three stages. Carley argues that while the first stage of self-determination referred to decolonisation, the second did not apply to people but to territories (Carley 1996:5). Carley further argued that the third stage of self-determination was considered an absolute right though, again, for colonies only; this marked a significant change from the previous era (Carley 1996:5). At this stage, one can understand that self-determination did not allow for secession; instead, the territorial integrity of existing states and most colonial territories was assumed (Carley 1996:6–7). This means that self-determination could only apply to colonies which were suffering from external oppression from their imperialist masters. Hannum says that the right to self-determination applies only to the peoples under foreign domination and do not apply to sovereign independent states (Hannum 1996:41–42). The point to understand is that the nature of self-determination during this period was not that all peoples had the right to it, but that all colonies had the right to be independent (Carley 1996:6–7).

In addition, Carley argues that the third, and most problematic, era in the development of the concept began with the end of decolonisation in the late 1970s and continues to the present (Carley 1996:8–9). This stage is characterised by the attempt in recent decades to fuse the first two eras; that is, to combine the ethnic and cultural rights of minorities that Wilson, the former USA President championed with the territorial absolutism of decolonisation (Carley 1996:10). Carley further argues that the result has been a tendency to redefine self-determination to mean that every distinctive ethnic or national group has a right to independence (Carley 1996:11). Although self-determination has taken on this new meaning in a popular sense, it is good to note that it remains a contentious and controversial topic in the nationalism and public international law literature (Cop and Eymirlioglu 2003:116).

The study by Kumbaro on the Helsinki Final Act highlights that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe adopted on 1 August 1975, embodied a Declaration on the Principles Concerning Mutual Relations of the participating states, which contains in its Principle VIII an explicit reference to internal and external self-determination (Kumbaro 2001:20). The study further argues that: "by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples have the right in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external political interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development" (Kumbaro 2001:20).

This means that that the right to self-determination is a continuous right, not a right exercised, once and for all, at the time of independence. One can therefore understand that as formulated by the above provision, self-determination applies to all people and

all the time. The question that one can seek to understand is the causes of self-determination, and to what extent it leads to the right of remedial secession, and whether the right to secession guarantees the peace and security that people long for when fighting for their liberty or freedom.

CAUSES OF SELF-DETERMINATION

In examining the causes behind the outbreak of self-determination movements, several realities of today's world simply cannot be ignored. For example, Carley notes that existing borders between internationally recognised nation-states are artificial, arbitrary, and accidental, not permanent as well (Carley 1996:12). Second, although some states, mostly in the West, are a reflection of the congruence of ethnic and territorial boundaries, most are not so constituted (Carley 1996:12). The other states are typically mini-empires or even greater empires of ethnically distinct peoples who find themselves arbitrarily forced to live within the same borders (Carley 1996:12).

Third, the current concern over self-determination is not merely a post-Soviet blip; that is, the dilemma is not just a regional, short-term phase following the break-up of the Soviet Union (Carley 1996:12). Here the argument is that many people all over the globe are going through their own process of self-discovery. As people discover themselves and their entitled rights, they also discover how oppressed they are and thus long for freedom. So, these people seek liberation to get back to their roots. And in many cases this liberation requires the right to self-determination which if conditions are met leads to the right of secession. This is the current case in South Cameroon and Kenya after the general elections of 8 August 2017.

The article argues that globalisation is another cause of self-determination in the sense that it gives people international awareness. Globalisation has brought the world together; it has to some extent removed boundaries. The growing international awareness is that things do not have to be the way they are, as identity groups discover that they no longer have to endure intolerable forms of government. This awareness has been accelerated by the contemporary application of the Western heritage of democracy and human rights, and the peculiarly American notion of individual fulfilment (Carley 1996:16).

It is important to note that the revolutionary developments in mass communications and social media are largely responsible for the spread of these ideas. In many instances, the introduction of such democratic values as "freedom of speech, assembly, and the press are accelerating the development of minority group's self-awareness and, in

some cases, demands for greater autonomy or even independence" (Carley 1996:14). In addition, there is a new kind of globalised elite that is increasingly alienated from the suffering masses (Carley 1996:15). This brings us to the next point of analysing whether self-determination implies an automatic right to secession.

DOES SELF-DETERMINATION ENTAIL AN AUTOMATIC RIGHT TO SECESSION?

The literature on public international law demonstrates that outside of the decolonisation context, the right to self-determination is recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Dugard 2005:103). This means that the right to self-determination becomes a universal right by granting remedial secession to all peoples who prove to be undergoing oppression and/or marginalisation. In Article 27 of ICCPR, it is stated that minorities are not denied this right but they may only exercise it together with other members of their group (Dugard 2005:103). Capotorti defines minority as a "group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of the State, in a non-dominant position, whose members being nationals of the State possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language" (Capotorti 1979:878).

By recognising the people as a whole, and minorities within that whole, the Covenant recognises not only the right to external self-determination but also the right to internal self-determination (Sohn 1982:50). External self-determination is an affirmation of the right within the decolonisation context favouring territorial integrity, and internal self-determination is the confirmation of the right to freedom in the post-decolonisation process. This means all people including minorities within the state after it has gained independence. And internal self-determination is the synthesis and sum of human rights (Kiwanuka 1988:76).

It does not generically mean the right to self-governance; but rather, the right to freely choose a government while exercising all the freedoms that make the choice possible (Kiwanuka 1988:76). Kiwanuka argues further that the right to internal self-determination serves to protect all people's individual human rights; hence it is the ultimate exercise of collective human rights and may be construed as a universal right (Kiwanuka 1988:76). Simpson argues that the territorial integrity of a country is only secured on the democratic representation of the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. If all people within a state are not democratically represented for example; every ethnic group within the state is not accorded the

legal right to take part in the democratic process by the state's municipal laws and the state's territorial integrity is not guaranteed by international law. Thus, territorial integrity is only guaranteed to the extent that it safeguards the interests of the people within the territory (Simpson 1996:283).

In this light, secession is highly permitted and granted. As Simpson argues, secession, in the context of the contemporary right to self-determination, must be viewed as a remedy of last resort, which is an exercise of collective human rights aimed at securing basic individual human rights, where the colonial model of self-determination has failed (Simpson 1996:283). For example, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference to the secession of Quebec case found that international law contained neither a right of unilateral secession nor an explicit denial of such a right (Supreme Court of Canada Report 1998:37). This means that in the case of Quebec, secession was not permitted because it fell short on criteria that could allow it to occur. This leads us to the next point of evaluating the criteria of secession and whether the right to the remedial secession resulting from the right to self-determination does entail automatic peace and security.

CRITERIA OF REMEDIAL SECESSION

As earlier argued, the term secession is understood as the action of separating or moving away from something which has existed for some period of time. For that separation to occur, criteria have to be put in place. This is the reason why self-determination does not entail an automatic right to secession (external self-determination) thus right to secession is permitted in very limited and extreme circumstances. Buchanan points out, there are two ways of deliberating over the issue of secession, the first being "moral reasoning about the conditions for an entity to have a right to secede, disregarding institutional requirements", and, second, "reasoning about the legitimate criteria for secession within the framework of international institutions and a morally defensible system of international law" (Buchanan 1997:32).

In exploring the literature on secession, Raic recognises and outlines some important criteria that lead to a qualified right to secession in very particular circumstances:

> *"(1) there must be a people which, though forming a numerical minority in relation to the rest of the population of the parent state, forms a majority within an identifiable part of the territory of that state;*
> *(2) the people in question must have suffered grievous wrongs at the hand of the parent state from which it wishes to secede consisting of either: a serious violation*

or denial of the right of internal self-determination of the people concerned; and/ or serious and widespread violations of the fundamental human rights of the members of that people; and
(3) there must be no further realistic and effective remedies for the peaceful settlement of the conflict" (Raic 2002:108).

Therefore, this article affirms that South Sudan's secession from North Sudan in 2011, Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan in 1971, Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia in 1993; and the dissolution of Yugoslavia into Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia; fully complied with the above criteria. The international community and the literature on public international law had no option other than to recognise them. In the case of secession attempts by Katanga from the former Congo (now called Democratic Republic of Congo) and Quebec (from Canada) it did not take place because they did not fully comply with the above criteria. These secession attempts lacked support from the UN and international law and thus were seriously condemned, and failed to take place.

Raz and Margalit say that the right to secede constitutes of primary right theories which construct the right to secession as a remedy for injustices, that is, as derivative upon the violation of other rights (Raz and Margalit 1990:87). They further argue that this right constitutes of remedial right theories which to the contrary, posit that a right unilaterally to secede exists per se, independently from the violation of other rights (Raz and Margalit 1990:87). In many cases, the right to secede ends up being granted mainly on the basis of nationality. It is important to note that remedial right theories of secession, unlike national self-determination and choice-theories, are built on the premise that secession is not a primary right of all peoples, but rather a remedial right that applies in a restricted number of cases, where certain conditions are met (Norman 2006:21–35).

This article argues that secession should speak to the wrongs suffered by a group, thus being justified only if some kind of injustice is present; as was the case of Kosovo in Serbia, South Sudan in Sudan. In some other cases, this injustice can result from a past annexation to which the group has never consented (such as annexation of the Baltic states by the USSR), or from an unfair treatment by the government such as the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan. This resulted in the lack of protection of their basic rights, security, a failure to safeguard the legitimate political and economic interests of their region, or a persistent discriminatory redistribution. Bauböck adds to the list of injustices that can justify secession violations of federal agreements and of distinctive collective rights (Bauböck 2000).

DOES THE RIGHT TO REMEDIAL SECESSION GUARANTEE PEACE?

Babbit argues that the majority of contemporary civil wars take place within states rather than between them, and in many of these cases self-determination crises are at the heart of the conflict (Babbit 2006:185). For example, in 2011 in 52 conflicts the quest to secede was a root cause of tensions, while in 73 per cent of conflicts with secessionist backgrounds violence escalated (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2011:2–5). Scholars have argued that the right to secession has to be understood as a right to resistance and defence against injustices committed against a group by the encompassing state (Buchanan 2003:217–221; Moore 2003:5–6; Norman 2003:41). This means that, this right is used as a way of resolving internal conflicts and bring peace. This argument is captured by Locke who argued that the right to secession gives the people a "right to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment of a new legislative to provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society" (Locke 1889: 307).

Yates (1998) and Pavkovic (2003) in their studies have identified several types of secession. They also highlighted a number of ways in which a political entity can secede from the larger or original state. These ways include:

- Secession from federation or confederation versus secession from a unitary state.
- Colonial aka wars of independence from a mother country or imperial state.
- National (seceding entirely from the national state) versus local (seceding from one entity of the national state into another entity of the same state).
- Central or enclave (seceding entity is completely surrounded by the original state) versus peripheral (along a border of the original state).
- Secession by contiguous units versus secession by non-contiguous units (exclaves).
- Separation or partition versus dissolution. Irredentism where secession is sought in order to annex the territory to another state because of common ethnicity or prior historical links.
- Minority (a minority of the population or territory secedes) versus majority (a majority of the population or territory secedes). Secession of better off regions versus secession of worse off regions.

The literature shows that the threat of secession is in many cases used as a strategy to gain greater autonomy within the original state. For example, Buchanan, a theorist of secession, argues that secession has been used to achieve political interests of certain individuals. Hence it fails to achieve its original goals of peace and security

(Buchanan 1991:87–123). His argument is supported and confirmed by the case of South Sudan whereby secession from Sudan has not yet brought peace to the country. It rather fuelled internal conflict among the South Sudanese people. Buchanan offered a number of arguments that are mainly used against secession: "Protecting legitimate expectations of those who now occupy territory claimed by secessionists, even in cases where that land was stolen. Self-defense if losing part of the state would make it difficult to defend the rest of it. Protecting majority rule and the principle that minorities must abide by them. Minimisation of strategic bargaining by making it difficult to secede, such as by imposing an exit tax. Soft paternalism because secession will be bad for secessionists or others. Threat of anarchy because smaller and smaller entities may choose to secede until there is chaos, although this is not the true meaning of the political and philosophical concept. Preventing wrongful taking such as the state's previous investment in infrastructure. Distributive justice arguments that wealthier areas cannot secede from poorer ones" (Buchanan 1991:87–123).

Pavkovic (2003) describes five justifications for a general right of secession within liberal political theory:

> *"(1) Anarcho-Capitalism: individual liberty to form political associations and private property rights together justify right to secede and to create a "viable political order" with like-minded individuals.*
> *(2) Democratic secessionism: the right of secession, as a variant of the right of self-determination, is vested in a "territorial community" which wishes to secede from "their existing political community"; the group wishing to secede then proceeds to delimit "its" territory by the majority.*
> *(3) Communitarian secessionism: any group with a particular "participation-enhancing" identity, concentrated in a particular territory, which desires to improve its members' political participation has a prima facie right to secede.*
> *(4) Cultural secessionism: any group which was previously in a minority has a right to protect and develop its own culture and distinct national identity through seceding into an independent state.*
> *(5) The secessionism of threatened cultures: if a minority culture is threatened within a state that has a majority culture, the minority needs a right to form a state of its own which would protect its culture" (Pavkovic 2003).*

Many African conflicts occur because people seeking ways of asserting their distinctive identity found that they had no means by which they could give expression to their distinctiveness. Moore argues that right to secession comes in as a last resort to end the intractable conflict (Moore 2003:5–6). Moore also argues that secession is justified if, and only if, the encompassing state has completely failed to

ensure basic human rights and the secured survival of a group (Moore 2003:5–6). Therefore, the right to secession within the framework of remedial right literature is to protect the existence of a minority against grave injustices. Buchanan suggests three kinds of injustices that are rampant in the internal conflict: "large-scale and persistent violations of basic individual human rights, unjust taking of a legitimate state's territory, and the violation of intrastate autonomy agreements" (Buchanan 2003:219–220). Such internal conflicts, if not dealt with have the capacity to spread beyond the borders of the state in question, and therefore pose threats to international peace and security.

While the right to remedial secession might have guaranteed peace on other continents, in Africa it has not been the case. The case of recurrence of conflict in South Sudan after the country had seceded from North Sudan shows that the right of secession in Africa does not necessarily lead to peace and security. Factors that have led to the right to secession in Africa failing to ensure peace are the lack of political will and patriotism, corruption, greedy leaders, and ethnic differences on the continent. These factors make it difficult for peace during the secession and its aftermath. Over a 30-year period the separation of the Eritrean territory from Ethiopia changed from a completely unthinkable option to the preferred solution for settling the conflict. Joireman's study on Ethiopia and Eritrea found that when secession did occur, it did not have the intended consequence of eliminating violent conflict, but rather it intensified and violent conflict between Eritreans and other states increased (Schneckener et al. 2004:178–179).

CONCLUSIONS

As Iglar argues, self-determination gives certain people a right to exercise local autonomy (Iglar 1992). In some cases, self-determination has led to secession while in some other cases it has not been the case. As was discussed, for self-determination to entail an automatic right to secession, all the criteria must be met. It was found that the right to self-determination still embodies the concept it was founded upon: the removal of alien rule; and governance freely determined by the people. However, the interpretation as to the people entitled to the right and whether they comprehend secession; is an ongoing debate. For this reason, this right does not entail an automatic secession, in many cases it entails referendum and it is not automatic that referendum will certainly go through. As argued by Onyeonoro, the right to self-determination cannot mean the freedom of every self-distinguishing ethno-cultural group to secede from an established state on a whim (Onyeonoro 1974:355–376). Therefore, self-determination does not entail an automatic secession.

It was also found that the right to secession does not automatically guarantee peace and security. This is because, while secession separates the oppressor and oppressed and guarantees a kind of reprieve to the oppressed, it does not deal with the root causes of the conflicts. As witnessed in many cases in Africa, the reprieved oppressed normally turn into tyrants and end up oppressing the people they said they were liberating. Moore (2003) and Pavkovic and Radan (2007), say that the right to secession remains wanting since in most secessionist struggles injustices do occur, but are not the root cause of conflict. Consider South Sudan's history that was marred by internal political conflicts between Christians and Muslims led by the government of Khartoum. Secession which granted South Sudan independence has failed to end the crisis and lead to peace. The new-born country is currently suffering from violent conflicts along ethnic lines, with new concerns being echoed that tensions might increase over the distribution of state resources, threatening both national and international peace. Hence, self-determination does not necessarily entail an automatic right to secession, and at the same time, right to secession does not automatically lead to peace and security.

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